City-zens of the Middle East:

 

Human Rights in the Urban Metropolis

 

(Part II)

 

By Hana Salama

 

 

This is the second part of a 2-part series about the relationship between urban citizenship and globalization. For Part I, please visit the January 2010 issue.
 

Globalization and the New City       

The phenomenon of the formations of new identities and rights claims within the city has to be seen against the backdrop of privatization, which has seen a shift from public to private authority in the public sphere. In this section the objective will be to define privatization as part of a larger “globalization” project and to evaluate the significance o this change on of its effects on the spatial and political organization of the new “global city.” Privatization in the city as we shall discuss in this section not a mere function of free markets working in a local context but it is driven in part by global forces in manifested on a local level which over time has the effect of attributing unchallenged authority to the increase privatization of space and security as the norm for a neo-liberal economy. Whereas the objective of this paper is to challenge this perceived legitimacy by looking both at opportunities and challenges which arise from this new urban geography of privatization.

Private Vs Public

Before discussing the effect of privatization of public space we must understand on what is meant by "privatization." There seems to be an uncontested separation between the private sphere and public sphere. Whereas the private sphere is associated with individual choice and free markets and the public sphere is almost inevitably associated with the state, public authority and the government, these distinctions seem to be increasingly rigid in the face of privatization or when private enterprises encroaches on so called “public space” (Hall & Bierstcker, 2003, pp. 4-5). Is there a clear distinction to these representational spheres?  In the Weber a tradition theorizing about the public sphere is about claiming the state has the only legitimate authority and monopoly over the physical use of force.  As mentioned, privatization cannot be studied independently of the context of transnational forces and the   authority behind it known as private authority.  Private authority deriving from the economic globalization can be defined in terms of an “integrated complex network of formal and informal institutions that have become a source of governance particularly over economic issues” (Hall & Bierstcker, 2003, p. 7).This source of governance is emerging both at a global and local level.

International Relations scholars such as Susan Strange and others write about this occurrence in terms of transnational actors which are increasingly acquiring power in the international political economy and have subsumed a degree of legitimacy to the extent that they are not being challenged (Ibid). While this further reinforces the binary opposition between public and private space, by reaffirming that the boundaries to public authority are being challenged by private forces which emerges a concrete manifestation of globalizing forces it assume that the state is powerless in the face of this new authority. However does this assumption reflect the reality? Is the state at best complicit to the rise of private authority? Or is it actively taking part in the emergence of private authority by creating policy which enables the private sphere to gain more authority? According to Louis Pauly, which partly opposes the former position, state authority is not being eroded by private authority rather national public authority is truly dominant in the area of financial regulation. The power to dispense financial regulatory rules “rest ultimately on public authorities of individual states and the public authority of international political institutions” (Pauly, 2003, p. 77). According to Pauly “governments routinely obfuscate their authority in financial markets” (Pauly, 2003) and this is not by coincidence or by global pressures, but is done in an effort to disguise political responsibility of some of the consequences associated with capitalist development (2003, p. 83). This is done by “blurring the lines between the public sphere and the private sphere” (Ibid).  This forms the basis of the argument is that the opposition between the public sphere and the private sphere is an artificial distinction in itself just as the binary representation of global and local state and non state is too simplistic and dualistic to reflect reality.

The public sphere is never completely free from private influences and vice-versa. According to Sassen private authority is nothing new to this type of globalization which we are experiences but has manifested itself in the presence of private agendas with in state institutions. (Sassen, 2003) This is evident at the local authority level with the privatization of security both where private security firms have been able to be represented with local authority institutions. This is exemplified in Theresa Caldeira’s account of the private security firms in Sao Paulo and their representation in local government bodies and the exchange of high ranking employees between the public sector organizations and private firms (Caldeira, 2000, p. 203).Finally the concept of denationalization of cities contributes to viewing private and public spheres as overlapping and heavily influencing each other because denationalization is a process which “ indigenizes the global agenda of both private and public actor” (Sassen, 2003, p. 93) relating not only to the economic sphere but also in the realm of civil society. The evidence of this is found in so called “National institutions” which are constituted of both national and private actors and agenda’s and formulate legal institutions such as deregulation and free trade for non-national private firms. Thus what is construed by the public as national and public authority can be a mix of private and public authorities converging agenda’s which fulfills neo-liberal economic deregulations.

 

Privatization in the cities: The case of gated communities

This blur between private and public  or the fact that the public always inevitably contains some amount of private in it, does not  in any way negate  the discussion if the privatization of space in the cities. It just asserts that nothing can be truly “public” but to the extent that public sphere can be redefined in terms of” a contested participatory site in which actors with overlapping identities as legal subjects, citizens economic actors, family and community members  form a public body and engage in negotiations and contestation over political social life”  (Rocco, 2000, p. 221). In other words, spaces in the city can and should be used by city-zens without public interference for various reasons but notably for political participation. In this sense urban citizenship is in part tied to the public realm as defined by spaces in the city which social life takes place. (Beauregard & Bounds, 2000) Given the artificial distinction between public and private it is not to say that what is private cannot be used for the public good. But in the context of global cities the number of public spaces where citizens from a multiplicity of backgrounds can interact is becoming scarce and this having impacting the social and spatial geography of the city.

From a socio-political perspective of the city the usurping of public spaces by private interests is in many ways detrimental to urban citizenship because it promotes segregation between those who can afford to live in a gated community and those who cannot. The phenomenon of gated communities or gated housing estates has been described as a global trend, to the extent that we see them appearing in just about every country (Glasze, Webster, & Frantz, 2006). Even if this is the case, the extent, impact and reasons for their relative success varies grossly in different regions of the world. The motivation behind private neighbourhoods is often expressed in terms of security and lifestyle. Security because generally there is a selective process by which people can enter and exit the premises of the private neighbourhoods often expressed by actually physical gates and armed guards and gated communities are often located outside the city to escape crime in the city. The second motivation that is often referred to its “lifestyle” neighbourhoods that are away from the city center and offer Green spaces, better facility and secure access to public goods such as electricity and water attracts many middle class and upper class citizens, especially in cities in developing countries where such amenities are rare.  There is also an image attached to this lifestyle of global living and luxury. These are more practical justifications offered by the residents who live in these communities (Glasze, 2006).

Theoretically, the emergence of these types’ private neighbourhoods can be seen through two interlinked themes.  The first being  the privatization of neighbourhoods as a manifestation  of cultural and economic globalization which includes as globalization of consumer tastes, rise in transnational elites and  increase social ethnic income heterogeneity in cities which have forced some elites into fortified enclaves. The second theme is that privatization emerged to fill a gap in local governance as a model of sub-governance.  In other words they provide an alternative form of governance which is historically and culturally embedded in the global and local convergence of taste and lifestyles which produce a path-dependent “spatial and social outcomes.” (Glasze, Webster, & Frantz, 2006) In the case of gated communities in the Middle East there is a tendency to look only at global factors which encompass a mix of these two themes, even though it might be the case that private neighbourhoods arise from the same forces of economic and cultural globalization as in other cities of the world,  a social network analysis of middle eastern cities grounded in historical and culturally embedded institutions, depicts the local forces which are both driving the privatization of neighbourhoods and determining the socio-political impact. In some Middle Eastern cities gated communities and gated estate has been interpreted as revival of spatial segregation of social and religious backgrounds of the old Middle Eastern towns.  However in other cities such as Beirut or Cairo the motivation to move into a gated community comes from the unreliable public authority to provide public goods which fills a gap in local governance which tends to be weakening by economic globalization. As Georg Glasze one of the few scholars who studies gated communities in the Middle East put it, “private housing estates [in the middle east] provide small scale solutions to nationwide problems” (Glasze, 2006, p. 131). However the social and potential environmental cost of this “solution” has not yet been evaluated.
 

Impact on Urban Citizenship:  Opportunities and Challenges

Thus far the picture which we painted for urban citizenship is bleak.  Rights to the city and the right for political participation is not distributed equally and this is impart due to privatization of services in the city and the decreasing wages for lower income workers (Sassen, 1999). Privatization of space is creating spatial and social segregation and in many cities in the global south as well as the north by pushing the most marginalized and vulnerable people, who often are at the lower scale of the global economy expressed in the city and benefit least from it, into the outskirts of the city outside of the city “zoning areas.” In these areas known as slums and ghettos are sometime purposely excluded of the cities administrative areas where the local government does not have any jurisdiction or responsibility to deliver services (Davis, 2006, pp. 61-85). It is difficult to see where an opportunity for urban citizenship arises in such a context. Nevertheless Charles Landry, author of the book the Creative City, believes that even this type of urban landscape is better for the poorer and marginalized members of society. He justified this by affirming that those who are marginalized by the global economy have more access in the city than they do in the country to transnational networks and solidarity  movements within the city  that are able to offer them some degree of a certain degree of social protection. These networks tend to congregate in city because of the centrality and significance of the city in national, regional and the global context. Urban citizenship is partly based on this opportunity to make the city a “space for solidarity,” Landry believes that the spatial organization of the city should encourage a better civic ethos (Landry & Bianchini, 1995). Again this is an idealistic perspective of what a city should be but,  are we seeing  the city being transformed into such a space?

The old American University in Cairo campus was within  metres of Tahrir square in the political heart of the city.

Today the university campus is in a new gated development in New Cairo, an area that was formerly desert in Helwan Governorate

On one hand privatization of public space in the city is challenging an urban citizenship as defined by Landry, Bounds and Beauregard, n the other hand authors such as Sassen and Rocco believe that this is being counter acted by new actors making rights claims which have increased demand-making power from below.  Rights claims from below are not a generic occurrence and have different manifestations according to the historical and cultural institutions of the region. In the Middle Eastern cities the prevalence of urban informality can be interpreted as strong claims to a right to a decent livelihood from below, an opportunity which perhaps would otherwise not present itself in the rural areas.  Another type of experience which is specific the historical and cultural institutions of Middle Eastern cities which is reacting to the local and global economic crisis, cultural and political crisis is the expression of fundamentalists movements. Although secular social movements in the middle east  have not  gotten nearly as much attention as Islamic movements , social networks in the city based on concerns for gender equality and the environment can also be seen as emerging “non- state authority “ of new social movements along with NGO’s and civic organization who mobilize to reverse the effects of privatization.  Comparatively these new forces are not as forceful as they are in other parts of the world, yet the growth and strength of these movements depends in the perceived agency city dwellers in the Middle East and the desire of these individual to make the city their basis for citizenship. 

Gated Communities in Middle Eastern Cities 

Methodology

The reason for studying the effects of privatization specifically privatization of space on urban citizenship in Beirut and Cairo is to exemplify both the exceptions and the rule when it comes to theorizing about citizenship and privatization. It is to show that global trends are taking place but the reaction to them or the way they are being institutionalized in the Middle East particularly is not homogenous and represents both the uniqueness and commonness of the effects of post modern/ globalization in major cities. Moreover, it is to address the lack in socio-political analysis of Middle Eastern cities and to move away from the focus on the historical organization of Middle Eastern town and how they are reflected to today. To accomplish this we will study gated communities in Beirut and Cairo through a social network analysis which is commonly applied to other global cities such as Johannesburg and Sao Paulo.  We will use the principals elaborated by Bruce Stanley on network analysis of Middle Eastern cities. Network analysis has been chosen as a theoretical basis for the study of privatization space to show that Middle Eastern cities are embedded because both their territorial existence and their socially constructed meaning (Stanley, 2005, p. 190).

Most Urban studies especially in the Middle East and North Africa study the city as its own entity rather than as part of a network. Which brings us to the second principal of network analysis is that cities are embedded within a system of cities. This means that cities are part of “Multiple networks among a similar set of nodes across time” (Stanley, 2005, p. 191).These networks have taken the characteristics over time of a city-system. The other organizing principle that we will look at in our analysis of gated communities in Beirut and Cairo is the multiple analytical scales in the city.  Analysis in the MENA region cannot be limited to a global/local dialectic buts must include national and regional contextualization. Stanley also suggests that there are more creative ways to evaluate scales such sub-regional systems, dyads, triads, communities and localities however this goes beyond the scope of the study. The final organizing principle is the institutional relationships within the cities and their positional implications. This principal looks at the nature of ties which bind networks together whether it’s weak ties, or strong ties. The importance of looking at relationships within the city and outside is to evaluate the connectivity of cities to other city-systems or regional system.  Looking at Middle Eastern cities though a social network analysis offers a more complete analysis of the city and helps us to understand the emergence and resilience of gated communities by focusing on institutional relationships within the city where links between privatization and citizenship is made obvious.

Although both cities are chosen from the MENA region, the context of the emergence of gated communities is different in Beirut that it is for Cairo The structure of government and the religious and ethnic composition of both cities are vastly different, however the basis for comparison comes from the connectedness of both cities within the region and their characteristics as a global city. Cairo has always been the main producer and exporter of Middle Eastern culture and Beirut closely following behind in the past 10 years.  Egypt itself has long had intimate ties with the west politically but that has been expressed in Cairo through western sources of investment and the infiltration of western media.  Lebanon has had considerably less political ties with the west but Beirut as a city has imagined ties (weak ties) which stem from liberalization and adoption of western cultural traits.  This may be due to the lesser importance of Islam in the city however there has been a conscious effort to link Beirut through the Mediterranean city-systems and European city-systems.

Beirut: Private Neighborhoods

In Lebanon gated communities are seen as a combination of common property and individual properties with access limitation of some sort such as private security gates fences etc. The term  private neighbourhoods more suitable for Lebanon and the term gated communities because the term  gated communities  is associated with a more North American association with communalism and anti urbanism, whereas private neighbourhoods is a more neutral  term and descriptive of the situation in Lebanon (Glasze & Alkhayyal, 2002, p. 322).   The first wave of private neighbourhoods was established during the civil war from the period of 1975 to 1990. The second phase was post war in the 1990’s. There are a number of assumptions about the emergence of private neighbourhood in Lebanon.   A. Raymond relates the emergence of private neighbourhoods in the Lebanon to a historical practice of spatial arrangement in old Arab towns, which compartmentalizes the city into religious and ethnic groups (Glasze, 2006, p. 129). This refers to earlier literature which observed that medieval Arab towns were ethnically and religiously segregated.

In contemporary Lebanon’s multi-confessional society the same practice was observed, however in post war Lebanon, the rise of private neighbourhoods was attributed this to “a rejection of city living altogether” (p. 129). In effect this could be attributed to symptom of modernization which promotes suburbanization and the retreat from the city a trend which is experience globally by elites.  The argument relating to a revival of old patterns of segregation in the middle east is over simplistic and   a network analysis of private neighbourhoods in Lebanon reveals that there was more contemporary motivation of private neighbourhoods in Beirut. Georg Glaze a leading scholar on private neighbourhoods in Lebanon relates the emergence of private neighbourhoods in Lebanon to a specific form of urban governance in Beirut.  Urban governance in Beirut is characterized by both state and non-state actors making path dependant decisions within a matrix of interests. The assumption is that private neighbourhoods is a direct product of specific urban govern mentality  is a reflection of institutions which facilitate the current power sharing national government in Lebanon which tries to balance the interests of Lebanon’s multi-religious groups. At a local scale, historical political and geographical factors according to Glasze form a unique local context, which must be taken into account in a social network analysis of the city.

 

The first wave of private neighbourhoods in Lebanon, developers and builders took advantage of weak state authority which was weaken by the conflict, and dealt with the Christian militia instead which had physical control of some areas of the cities. Developers’ of private neighbourhoods said that they responded to a demand of high income families who wanted to seek refuge from the war. Many families saw private neighbourhoods as physical security for their family but also were anxious to maintain a certain standard of living with adequate water supply and electricity (Glasze, 2006, pp. 131-133). Thus new informal institutions were created to deal with the demand because of the weak governance which existed at the time of the conflict. These institutions were informal and sometimes illegal because developers were not officially entitled to build on the chosen lands outside the city limits, however these institutions and their associated practices continued throughout the post-war period.  

 

In the post war period the re- appearance of Private neighbourhoods was no longer motivated by a refuge from the war, rather investors and developers believed that there was hope for a post war economic boom driven by the real estate sector as Beirut re-inserted itself into the regional and global economy in hopes of becoming the center for tourism and economic growth in the middle east (Glasze & Alkhayyal, 2002, pp. 331-33). This meant that private neighbourhoods moves away from being represented as refuge and now developers tried to emphasize global lifestyle  which represented comfort and luxury  and green spaces which was being reproduced in other places in the middle east (Glasze, 2006, pp. 133-135). A Beirut is embedded to its regional and global  context through ties one of them being the millions of Lebanese migrant workers in the middle east and internationally who  have been  living in ”gated communities” and wish to return or find a primary or secondary residence of the same style which creates ties between cities. In practicality however these have proven to be weak ties as the demand for private housing was much lower than anticipated (Glasze & Alkhayyal, 2002, p. 333). This is due to a number of structural factors in the housing market in Lebanon which interacted with a declining global and regional economy.  Finally from the account of private neighbourhoods in Lebanon and more specifically Beirut, it can be concluded that private neighbourhoods have arisen in a specific local context and the regional and global scale of analysis are significant but are not as great as the local factors. In fact private neighbourhoods in Beirut come and fill a specific gap in local governance coinciding with a global trend.  
 

Cairo: Luxury Gated Communities

In Egypt the emergence of gated housing estates can be traced to the 1980’s where there was a conscience policy of economic liberalization in order to ensure Egypt’s transition into capitalism. The first types of gated estates were much like Lebanon sea side communities around the north-western cost catering the elite classes. In the 1990’s there is the appearance of private neighbourhoods in Cairo where luxurious developments are continued to be planned however just like in Lebanese cities such as Beirut  the investment in this type of housing is by far surpassing its demand and this is evident in the vacancy of these communities and the declining prices (Kader, 1999). In Cairo rather than a genuine concern for safety, the promise of a lifestyle away from the bustle the city is a more significant factor in the motivation to move to a gated community.  Petra Kuppinger who writes about the marketing of luxury housing estate in Cairo attributes this to the recent uncertainty that residents of Cairo have experienced with structural and political cracks, ongoing political tension, militant Islamic activism, pollution and poverty and the persistent urban unrest because of the high density of population, thus elites wanted more permanent escape from this (Kuppinger, 2004, p. 38). This local force was met with economic liberalization.
 

The late 1990’s marked a significant change, materially and socially, in the Cairo cityscape, not only was there a retreat by Cairo elites but the privatization of public spaces such as hotels, golf courses and malls which expanded the city limits into the surrounding desert. As mentioned Gated communities in Cairo and the surrounding desert vary in luxury and exclusivity but they all profess to provide a distinguish way of in proximity of the city but away from it. Kuppinger notes that the names given to these development some in Arabic some in English some in both English and Arabic  and some in French represents the location of  the residents of these communities  on the global elite map. Gates and gated communities themselves in Egypt represent both a fulfillment of a need to deal with a rather poor quality of life within the city but is a reflection of the extreme form of classism which tends to towards the western model of living and distance itself from the social and cultural fabric of Egypt.


 

This coincides with the global trend of homogenizing of consumer taste is coupled with fears which are experienced in other major cities in the south such as crime, “the street” and poverty. However subjectively, the fear of crime related to poverty  is more difficult to measure and probably has less to do with why elites in Cairo seeks gated communities as their preferred type of residence. Just as in Lebanon there is a local concern about the delivery of services in the city, general over crowdedness of the city and new fears about militant Islamic activism which takes place in the city (Kuppinger, 2004). The fear of Islamic militant activism in Cairo almost is equivalent to the fear of “street crime” in cities like Sao Paulo and Johannesburg however this threat of militant activism is manifested in a different way and more sporadic than crime experienced in those cities. Kuppinger also notes that the way some  gated communities are advertized they” represent the localization of the global where ones neighbor in the larger sense of co-urban dweller – no longer are possibly disrupting members of different classes” (Kuppinger, 2004). They are forcibly well travelled globalized Egyptian elites by their choice of residing in the community.  In comparison with Lebanon gated communities in Cairo also fill a gap in local governance to a certain extent. However the motivation to develop and move in to these communities is much more dependent on a global trend to achieve a certain lifestyle in the city without really living “in” the city.  

Analysis:  A local form of Urban Citizenship

Up to this point we have prefaced the discussion about urban citizenship with the process of modernization and globalization. Marginalized groups and individuals in society have been able to make new rights claims due to modernization and reliance on transnational networks from the state. A citizenship from below has pushed the modern nation state to recognize and accommodate conflicting demands.  Many commentators see   globalization as a homogenizing force which homogenizes culture consumer taste and turns the world into a global village, others view it as a force which fragments identities and highlights differences.  These opposing forces are highly visible in the city.

So far the literature we examined on gated communities In Cairo and Beirut does not discuss these incidents of privatization of public space in relation to urban citizenship the rights to the city and the socio-political effect of the later on the social and cultural fabric of these societies.  In the case of Lebanon and Egypt it is clear that private neighbourhoods and gated communities can only be afforded by a small portion of the population, mainly the globalized elites who wish to escape the city and live in a specific form of residence which is influenced by the global taste and can also be viewed as a western style of living. However gates represent a social devolution on their own. As Blakely and Snyder argue “Gates and fences around residential neighbourhoods represent more than simple physical barriers. Gated communities manifest a number of tensions: between exclusionary aspirations rooted in fear and protection of privilege and the values of civic responsibility; between the trend toward privatization of public services and the ideals of the public good and general welfare” (Salama, 2007, p. 11). In fact as Caldeira and others have argued  gated communities are a sign of social and spatial segregation form the larger community and which has the effect of reducing civic engagement outside the gated community. Indeed in both Beirut and Cairo there is a perception of a failing local authority and sense of urban citizenship being curtailed especially when a segment of society is choosing to wall itself off in enclaves. The continuing widening and narrowing of space for urban citizenship is affected also by local factors A closer examination privatization and politics in middle eastern cities will illustrate that it is both global and local Forces which engendering spaces for new identities and politics which generate new citizenship rights and obligation in the middle east (Isin E. F., 2001, p. 351). In Lebanon this is being demonstrated by new social actors which are concerned with the environment and are being more vocal against building beach resorts and privatization of the coast of Lebanon (Glasze, 2006, p. 140). These new social actors in Egypt and Lebanon which express both a global agenda and a local agenda are rather still in their nascent stages.
 

Urban citizenship is also finding expressions increasingly in an exclusive local form .This form which is more strongly manifested in Egypt than in Lebanon due to obvious demographic reasons, is the Islamitization of politics in the Middle East . This refers to both the increased recognition of the Islamic agenda at the formal political level and increase activism of Islamic inspired groups at the informal political level (Ismail, 2000).  According to Engin F Isin ,  Islamitization of politics in the Middle East needs to be understood as an urban and social movement that takes various  forms  from more extremist movement  to moderate activism. In Egypt, Islamitization of politics has reached the electoral level only recently but in fact local-level politics have always been present by a network of mosques and lead by the ikhwan  known as the Muslim brotherhood.  These types of Islamic organizations operate at the level of day to day experience express in city dwellers lives and offers a different  of citizenship which offers a alternative to westernization, consumerism  capitalism even privatization as a source of alternative identity. This type of citizenship has even been  named “ Islamic citizenship” (Isin E. F., 2001) is strengthen by transnational Islamic networks and  affects Egypt as well as Lebanon, it is more widespread in Egypt  and largely concentrated in the south in Lebanon because of the presence of the Shi'a Muslim community. The Islamitization of politics corresponds both to a local a regional trend   and is  one out of many factors, but can arguably be the strongest  given its strong links to regional and global networks.

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Hana Salama graduated with a Bachelor of Arts in International Development and Globalization from the University of Ottawa and a Master of Science in Human Rights from the London School of Economics (LSE). This three-part series of articles are based on her dissertation research on citizenship in the Middle Eastern urban setting. Her email is hana.salama@gmail.com

 

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